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Capital Punishment as a System*
Jack Greenberg t
The contemporary debate over capital punishment has been conducted
principally in terms of whether it is an effective deterrent,' appropriately
retributive, 2 racially discriminatory,3 arbitrary,4 or inevitably prone to er-
ror.' In support of their positions, the contending sides have offered statis-
tical and anecdotal arguments on deterrence, racial discrimination, and
arbitrariness, as well as value judgments concerning whether the death
penalty is, on the one hand, properly retributive or, on the other, morally
acceptable. But, as the debate has proceeded over the past fifteen years,
courts have imposed more than 2,000 capital sentences." The resulting
pattern of decisions has introduced a new means of assessing the viability
of the capital sentencing process.
This Article explores the implications of this pattern of capital punish-
ment decisions. It argues that the capital convicting and sentencing process
has necessarily become extraordinarily careful to avoid executing those
who are innocent or who deserve some sentence other than death. The
substantial number of defendants sentenced to death who have subse-
quently been found innocent, and the much greater number who have
been convicted or sentenced in violation of law, demonstrate the need to
employ such scrupulous care. Because of the large number of nullified
convictions and sentences that have resulted from the exercise of such care,
only one person has been executed against his will during the past fifteen
years; three others have been executed because they refused to contest
their convictions or sentences. Yet over 1000 death-sentenced prisoners are
*The data in this article was assembled by Carol Palmer, a legal assistant at the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, who was assisted by Andrew J. Furer and Steven Rabiner, both
Harvard undergraduates ('84). I also have been assisted by Amy Bard (Rutgers '82), Christine R.
Fryer (Columbia '83), Sidney Keith (Chicago '81), Howard B. Levi (Columbia '82), and Nina F.
Locker (Stanford '83), while they were 1981 summer associates at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson, and by Linda Poon (N.Y.U. '82) and William S. Laufer (Northeastern '83).
tDirector-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
1. See, e.g., Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death,
65 AM. EcON. REV. 397 (1975); Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths,
1976 SUP. CT. REV. 317.
2. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 237-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); W. BERNS, FOR
CAPITAL PUNISIIMENT 128-76 (1979).
3. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes,
26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563 (1980).
4. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5. See C. BLA(:K, JR., CAPITAL PUNISIMENT (1974) (inherent frailties in capacity of law to make
valid factual and legal determinations with regard to imposing death penalty).
6. See infra p. 917.
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now or soon will be litigating their sentences or convictions on appeal or
in post-appellate proceedings.7 Such a system cannot serve the purported
goals of capital punishment-deterrence and retribution. Nor can the
death penalty be administered evenhandedly under such a system; indeed,
selection of those who have been executed has been exceedingly aberrant.
Moreover, there is no likelihood that the system or its outcomes will
change sufficiently to serve acceptably the stated purposes of capital
punishment.
In effect, the system of capital punishment is a jural version of the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which asserts, for the physical sciences,
that the act of observing a physical phenomenon may itself distort the
phenomenon under observation. In a similar fashion, the scrupulous but
necessary review of capital sentencing so affects the system that it cannot
accomplish its purposes. Only a complete revision of our political and le-
gal system, which is not foreseeable, or the abolition of capital punishment
can resolve this dilemma.
I. Scrutiny of Capital Sentences
Statistics on the use of the death penalty in the United States, particu-
larly for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are imprecise; dif-
ferent sources frequently conflict. But by the most conservative estimate,
there have been 5,707 executions since 1864.8 Of those executed, only
7. See NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. 1 (April 20, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Death Row U.S.A.] The numbers in this Article that indicate numbers of persons
on death row or the legal status of their convictions and sentences are derived from information gath-
ered by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) since 1975 and, before then, by
Douglas Lyons, who between 1970 and 1972 was a staff member at LDF. Before and after working
for LDF, Lyons directed Citizens Against Legalized Murder (CALM), an anti-capital punishment
organization that also gathered information later incorporated into LDF statistics. The information is
collated periodically and circulated by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in Death
Row, U.S.A. The statistics for years prior to 1975 are reliable but, because of CALM's limited re-
sources, not highly so. For recent years the information is highly accurate, although on occasion inac-
curacies have been discovered. In any event, the information is the best available, and is cited by the
courts, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 nn.7 & 8 (1980), the media, e.g., U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, May 11, 1981, at 72, and scholars, e.g., Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1980). The Appendix to this Article refines Death Row, US.A. statistics further,
principally by taking into account reimposition of the death penalty on a single defendent following
new trial or new sentencing proceedings, and multiple impositions on a single defendant for more
than one crime. It also reflects the correction of errors occasionally discovered in Death Row, US.A.
8. See Teeters & Zibulka, Executions under State Authority-An Inventory, reprinted in W.
BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA app. A (1974). This catalogue does not include executions per-
formed under local rather than state authorities. Most of the information in the Teeters-Zibulka
inventory was supplied by wardens from the records of the departments of corrections of various
states. By contrast, using data from The National Prisoner Statistics "Executions" bulletin, the Chi-
cago Tribune, and other sources, Bedau estimated that a total of 7,226 legal executions, under either
state or local authority, took place in the United States from 1900 through 1966. See H. BEDAU, TlE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 35-36 (rev. ed. 1967) (Table 1). For the most recent compilation, see
Espy, Inventory by Jurisdiction of Legal Executions, in W. BOWER.S, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA (forth-
coming ed.). Mr. Espy used data collected from court records, newspapers, local and county histories,
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3,593 appealed their cases to the highest state courts;9 325 took their cases
to the Supreme Court of the United States; and 129 sought relief through
habeas corpus in the federal district courts.' 0 Thus, even assuming a wide
margin of error, in years past a large number of death sentences were
executed without exhaustion of legal remedies that today are
commonplace.
This failure to appeal death sentences in many past cases, however, is
not surprising. Automatic review of capital sentences was not required in
many states until the 1930's or later." Indeed, at the time of Gary Gil-
more's death sentence in Utah in 1976, automatic appeal to that state's
highest court was not available. 2 Of course, defendants have had the op-
tion to appeal, but many have not exercised it, in largest part because of
poverty.' 3 Virtually all capital defendants have been poor," and free legal
services have not been readily available. Even after the Supreme Court
interpreted the Constitution to require that states provide free counsel in
felony cases,"s lawyers ordinarily were not provided to seek Supreme
Court review,' 6 even in capital cases.' 7 Even had counsel been provided to
and department of corrections records from various states to compile his listing. He has confirmed and
documented a total of 12,839 executions carried out under civil authority from colonial times through
August 8, 1981. While Mr. Espy's listing includes some omissions from the Teeter-Zibulka listing,
his much larger total figure is primarily due to the large number of executions performed under local,
rather than state, authority well into the 1950's, as well as the different time span that his survey
covers. See also W. BOWER.S, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 63-69 (1974) (discussing completeness of Teet-
ers-Zibulka data).
9. Those 2,114 who did not appeal to the highest state courts were sent to their deaths following
imposition of the death sentence by the trial court without further judicial proceedings, except for a
few cases involving proceedings in an intermediate appellate court. See Teeters & Zibulka, supra note
8.
10. See Teeters & Zibulka, supra note 8. These statistics on appeals and other efforts to secure
post-conviction relief are open to question. Information on appeals was derived from indices to the
Decennial Digests published by the West Publishing Company. Teeters and Zibulka explain that this
information is not completely accurate, in part because many defendants with common surnames had
their appeals confused with other defendants of the same name who were not executed. Id. at 200.
Moreover, in some states, as in Ohio until 1968, the court of appeals in each county decided but did
not report appeals. C Bruck, The Four Men Strom Thurmond Sent to the Chair, Wash. Post, April
26, 1981, § C, at 1, col. I (two did not appeal death sentences to state supreme court).
11. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-22-150 (1975) (automatic appeal introduced in 1943); CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1239 (West 1970) (automatic appeal introduced in 1935).
12. Automatic appeal was introduced in Utah in 1977. See UTAH CRIM. CODE. § 76-3-206
(1977).
13. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251-52, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
14. See Greenberg & Himmelstein, Varieties of Attack on the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 112, 114 (1969); cf. Ehrmann, The Human Side of Capital Punishment, in H. BEDAU, supra
note 8, at 492, 510-11 (defendants that are executed are overwhelmingly poor). See generally Adderly
v. Wainwright, 58 F.R.D. 389, 401, 405 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (habeas petitioners, sentenced to death,
found to be "functional illiterates").
15. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). Even before Gideon, however,
counsel were required in capital trials under Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (Fourteenth Amendment does not compel appoint-
ment of counsel for indigent state inmates seeking review of their convictions in Supreme Court).
17. See Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner Billy George Hughes Jr.'s
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seek review of capital cases in the Supreme Court, however, because it
was uncommon for counsel to raise federal questions in state criminal
prosecutions, even capital prosecutions, most cases did not present issues
appropriate for Supreme Court review.
Federal habeas corpus was also rarely sought in capital cases before the
late 1960's. Until the Supreme Court's decision in Fay v. Noia'" in 1963,
constitutional rights available but not asserted in state court could almost
never be reviewed on federal habeas corpus. Moreover, the considerable
expansion of the accused's rights and their enforcement against the states
through incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment did not occur until
the late 1960's.19 Only then did capital convictions and sentences first be-
Request for Appointment of Counsel to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Hughes v. Texas,
436 U.S. 953 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law]. In none of the states
with death penalty statutes is continued representation required to petition for certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court. The only state explicitly authorizing appointment of counsel to prepare a
certiorari petition is California. See In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 633, 447 P.2d 117, 131, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 21, 35 (1968), cert. denied 406 U.S. 971 (1972).
Until 1962, only one volunteer group of lawyers, New Jersey Citizens Against the Death Penalty,
Inc., existed solely for the purpose of undertaking appeals on behalf of indigent defendants. Its activi-
ties were limited by the magnitude of the task and a lack of funds. Even today lawyers appointed for
the trial or state appeal of capital cases frequently "bail out" after state supreme court affirmance. See
Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 7 n.6 (listing certiorari petitions filed late
due to sudden departure of assigned counsel in capital cases); ABA House of Delegates, Section of
Criminal Justice, Recommendation No. 102B (Feb. 1979). Volunteers usually replace them, but find-
ing a replacement is often difficult.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (rejecting concepts that had traditionally inhibited the administration of
federal habeas corpus remedy-such as "adequate state ground," "waiver," and "failure to exhaust
state remedies"-and holding the writ available to any state prisoner who had not "deliberately by-
passed" the assertion of federal rights).
19. These rights included the right to a certain standard of proof, see In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged), the right
against self-incrimination, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment prohibition
against compelled self-incrimination applicable to states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
(privilege against self-incrimination includes right of person under restraint by police to remain si-
lent), protection against double jeopardy, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeop-
ardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment),
various Sixth Amendment rights, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses applicable to the states); Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial applicable to states); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of opposing witnesses applica-
ble to states), the right to counsel, see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (right to counsel
extended to preliminary hearing, purpose of which was to determine if sufficient evidence existed to
present case to grand jury and if so to fix bail); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to
counsel extended to sentencing hearing that had been postponed subject to probation); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to counsel extended to post-indictment line-up); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right extended for first appeal of right from state criminal conviction);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed counsel held to attach in felony cases
at every critical prosecutorial stage), Fourth Amendment rights, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures and to have ex-
cluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized), and the right to a trial transcript provided
by the state, see Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (indigent defendant, appealing his conviction
on nonfederal grounds must be provided with trial transcript from state); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963) (same right extended in state post-conviction proceeding where filing of transcript was
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gin to come under careful, systematic scrutiny in state courts, lower fed-
eral courts, and the Supreme Court.
The genesis of that effort to scrutinize capital cases has been described
elsewhere; but briefly, it began with a campaign to eliminate the discrimi-
natory application of the death penalty for rape."0 Between 1930 and the
present, of the 455 persons executed for rape, 405 were black and two
were members of other minorities. 21 Almost 90% of those executed were
black men convicted for the rape of white women.2 On the basis of this
racial disparity, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund undertook in the mid-
1960's to invalidate the death penalty for rape.23 But because counsel in
such cases owed their clients the obligation of raising all relevant substan-
tial issues, they chose to attack the death penalty not only on the issue of
racial inequality, but also on such general grounds as the exclusion of
jurors with scruples against capital punishment, and the arbitrariness of
its imposition. Moreover, issues not directly related to the death penalty
also came under careful review. Counsel raised issues such as the right to
counsel, illegal search and seizure, coerced confession, and discrimination
in jury selection, as well as state law questions concerning the admissibil-
ity of evidence, charge to the jury, and the like. A number of organiza-
tions, aided by volunteer lawyers and public defenders, gradually became
involved in the effort, '24 thereby assuring that almost every capital convic-
necessary to give reviewing court appellate jurisdiction); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966)
(same right extended to transcript in post-conviction proceedings); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40
(1967) (same right extended to transcript of preliminary hearing to aid defendant in preparing chal-
lenge to his conviction); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (same right extended to transcript
of lower court habeas proceeding for use in filing application for new habeas proceeding before higher
state court). This is only a partial catalog of rights of the accused defined by the Supreme Court that
in earlier years had not been recognized. Lower courts have defined additional rights.
20. See H. BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 83 (1977);
Greenberg & Himmelstein, supra note 14, at 113-15.
21. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 75 (1973).
22. See Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119,
123 (1973). See also M. MELTSNER, supra note 21, at 77 ("overwhelming majority" of executions for
rape involved white victim and black defendant). Numerous studies present evidence of the racially
discriminatory imposition of the death penalty. See, e.g., Johnson, Selective Factors in Capital Pun-
ishment, 36 SOC. FORCES 165 (1957); Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty:
A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49
TEMP. L.Q. 261 (1976). See also Wolfgang & Riedel, supra (listing such studies).
23. See H. BEDAU, supra note 20, at 83-84. See also M. MELTSNER, supra note 21, at 75; Green-
berg & Himmelstein, supra note 14, at 115.
24. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund has represented a great many capital
defendants on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings. The Team Defense Project, Inc., founded in
July, 1976, and based in Atlanta, Georgia, is a group of lawyers and social scientists devoted to trying
cases for the purpose of avoiding the death sentence, even in cases where the defendant's guilt is
beyond doubt. The Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery, Alabama, a nonprofit foundation
that since 1971 has litigated a variety of issues affecting the legal and civil rights of poor people,
represents many defendants who face the death penalty. The Southern Defense Committee, with of-
fices in New Orleans and Nashville, handles many capital cases. The Death Penalty Task Force,
formally organized in 1976 within the office for Public Advocacy in Frankfort, Kentucky, is a group
of attorneys who advise local public defenders appointed to capital cases; it handles the more difficult
Vol. 91: 908, 1982
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tion came under careful review.
Although the effort commenced with rape cases, the non-racial issues
raised were not by nature confined to such cases; consequently, these is-
sues were presented in all capital cases. The program, therefore, contin-
ued even after the death penalty for rape was held unconstitutional in
Coker v. Georgia.21 Substantial racial disparities persist, however, in capi-
tal cases for other crimes.
26
This campaign means that almost all current capital cases will receive
careful examination in post-trial and post-appellate proceedings. It has
resulted in a virtual moratorium on executions in the United States since
1967. Only four men have been put to death: John Spenkelink died invol-
untarily after exhausting his legal appeals 27 while Gary Gilmore," Jesse
Bishop,29 and Steven Judy" refused to pursue available post-conviction
review and permitted the state to execute them." Except in such instances,
where defendants eschew efforts to upset their convictions or sentences,
death sentence cases itself from trial through post-conviction proceedings. The Office of Public De-
fenders of the State of California, created in 1976 with a primary statutory responsibility of death
penalty representation, has represented approximately one-third of all persons sentenced to death in
California since the reenactment of the death penalty in that state in 1977. It also disseminates re-
search material to other appointed counsel and trial attorneys in capital cases. Of course, public de-
fenders, particularly in Florida, South Carolina, and North Carolina have represented many capitally
charged defendants, and the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association has presented training
sessions on how to conduct the defense of a capital case. Moreover, many large law firms that nor-
mally handle corporate and business matters have volunteered to represent capital defendants, usually
on appeal or in post-conviction proceedings, for no fee.
25. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
26. Capital punishment is ordered far more often for defendants who kill whites than for those
who kill blacks. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 3, at 578, 594, 599.
27. See Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla. 1975) (affirming both conviction and sentence),
cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976). Spenkelink's various attempts at
relief were all denied. See Spenkelink v. State, 350 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1977) (affirming trial court's denial
of defendant's motion for collateral relief), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977); Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming district court's dismissal of petition for federal habeas
corpus and termination of stay of execution), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979), reh'g denied, 441
U.S. 937 (1979); Spinkelink v. Wainwright, 442 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1979) (deny-
ing application for stay of execution); Spenkelink v. Wainwright, 372 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 1979) (denying
petition for writ of habeas corpus and application for stay of execution). See also Clark, Spenkelink's
Last Appeal, NATION, Oct. 27, 1979, at 385.
The various spellings of the defendant's name are those used by the cited opinions. The correct
spelling is Spenkelink. See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 582 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978).
28. See N. MAILER, THE EXEC:UTIONER'S SONG (1980).
29. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1979, § 1, at 27, col. 1.
30. See N.Y. Times, March 9, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 8, 1981, § 1, at 22, col.
3.
31. Subsequent to the consensual executions of Gilmore, Bishop, and Judy, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Tenth and Fifth Circuits decided cases that, had they been decided before
the executions, would have furnished a legal basis upon which third parties could have challenged the
convictions and sentences. See Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1981); Beavans v. Maggio,
Nos. 81-3668 & 81-3669, slip op. (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 1981). See generally Note, The Eighth Amend-
ment and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1980) (arguing that
Eighth Amendment forbids execution of the mentally incompetent).
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never again will there be executions without appellate and post-conviction
review.
II. Constitutional Constraints on the Death Penalty
The systematic review of capital cases that began after 1967 has re-
sulted in various constitutional limits on the imposition of capital punish-
ment. Courts and juries must sentence rationally and according to uniform
standards," and higher standards of appellate review are required in capi-
tal than in other cases.33 Yet this attempt to constitutionalize capital pun-
ishment has not reduced the heavy and erratic flow of death-sentenced
defendants onto and off of death row.
A. Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,34 the Supreme Court introduced the
requirement that sentencing be conducted according to rational standards,
thus holding unconstitutional capital punishment as then administered in
the United States. Although nine separate opinions accompanied the
Court's per curiam decision, it is fair to say that the case stands for the
proposition that capital punishment, as then administered, was inflicted
arbitrarily or "freakishly,"" as one of the Justices put it, and was there-
fore cruel and unusual. It could be upheld only if it were applied regu-
larly and evenhandedly. Justices Marshall and Brennan 7 thought capi-
tal punishment unconstitutional under any circumstances, while Justice
Douglas apparently thought it unconstitutional because it was adminis-
tered in a discriminatory fashion against minorities and the poor.3
32. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). See also
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-21 (1968) (potential jurors who oppose capital punishment
can be struck from jury only if their beliefs are such that they would automatically vote against death
penalty regardless of evidence). Normally death sentence statutes provide for a three-tiered sentencing
process after conviction. First, a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted where the jury (or the
judge in a case tried without a jury) hears additional evidence in mitigation or aggravation of punish-
ment. Second, the judge imposes sentence guided by the jury's recommendation. Third, the state su-
preme court automatically reviews all cases in which death has been imposed.
33. See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (death sentence may not constitutionally be
imposed after jury verdict of guilt of capital offense where jury was not permitted to consider lesser
included offense, because risk of unwarranted conviction under such circumstances cannot be tolerated
when defendant's life is at stake); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(greater sentencing safeguards needed to ensure particularized consideration of defendants); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (plurality opinion) (qualitative difference between capital punish-
ment and any other punishment necessitates greater safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious im-
position of death penalty).
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
35. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 358-60.
37. Id. at 305.
38. Id. at 256-57.
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Furman and pre-Furman anti-death penalty litigation resulted in va-
cated death sentences for about 860 defendants, including all 629 persons
on death row at the time of Furman.9 While Furman was the landmark
death penalty decision, prior court decisions had also overturned death
sentences on constitutional grounds. In early 1972, the California and
New Jersey State Supreme Courts held capital punishment unconstitu-
tional in People v. Anderson'0 and State v. Funicello,4t removing 101 and
22 defendants from death row, respectively. In 1971, the Supreme Court
of the United States vacated over two dozen death sentences42 in light of
Witherspoon v. Illinois.41 Witherspoon, a 1968 Supreme Court decision,
had held that capital defendants may not be tried by juries from which
jurors with scruples against capital punishment have been excluded. Alto-
gether, from several dozen to perhaps more than 100 death sentences were
vacated on Witherspoon grounds in state and federal courts. 4' Also during
1971, the Court vacated seven death sentences4 on United States v. Jack-
son46 grounds. Jackson, another 1968 Supreme Court decision, had held
that defendants could not be tried under systems that subjected them to
the death penalty only if they went to trial but assured punishment no
more severe than life imprisonment if they pleaded guilty.
B. The Response of the States to Furman
Following Furman, states passed two types of death penalty statutes:
mandatory capital punishment statutes, and guided discretion capital stat-
utes. The mandatory laws required that anyone who committed a capital
offense must be sentenced to death. Their proponents asserted that
mandatory laws eliminated from capital sentencing the arbitrariness and
39. See List of Persons on Death Row at Time of Furman (prepared by Douglas Lyons) (on file
with Yale Law Journal). One source of inaccuracy in LDF statistics, which is less prevalent today
because of more thorough information gathering processes, is the difficulty of ascertaining the exis-
tence of death-sentenced prisoners in county jails who have not yet been transferred to state peniten-
tiaries where reporting is more systematic. Therefore, at the time of Furman, there probably were, in
addition to 629 known prisoners under death sentence, a number in county jails whose status had not
been recorded.
40. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
41. 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55, cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
42. See Hunter v. Tennessee, 403 U.S. 711 (1971) (per curiam) (requiring state appeals courts to
reconsider death sentences in light of Witherspoon); 403 U.S. 946-48 (1971) (listing memoranda dis-
positions reversing death sentences in light of Witherspoon).
43. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
44. This estimate is based upon the author's conversations on September 18, 1981, with Joel
Berger, Jack Boger, and Deborah Fins, Staff Attorneys, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., who specialize in representing capital defendants.
45. 403 U.S. 948 (1971) (listing memoranda dispositions reversing death sentences in light of
Jackson). It may be that additional defendants asserting Jackson defenses had their death sentences
vacated in lower courts in unreported decisions.
46. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
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freakishness that Furman had found constitutionally offensive. The
guided discretion laws required juries or judges to weigh various aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors in deciding whether or not a particular defen-
dant should be executed.
Both kinds of statutes were challenged in the Supreme Court in 1976.
In Woodson v. North Carolina,47 the Supreme Court struck down the
mandatory statutes. The Court based its decision on the notion that this
country had progressed too far as a civilization to permit imposing the
death penalty without regard to the particular circumstances of the crime
or the character and background of the defendant. The Court did, how-
ever, uphold the concept of guided discretion statutes in Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 4 8 Proffitt v. Florida,49 and Jurek v. Texas." But although the laws
challenged in those cases were found constitutional on their face, their
constitutionality as applied remains to be determined."
Gregg and Woodson, like Furman, resulted in the vacating of a large
number of capital sentences. By July, 1976, there were 592 persons on
death row, 2 each sentenced to death under capital statutes passed after
Furman. Between July, 1976, and October, 1979, Gregg and Woodson
resulted in the vacating of approximately 414 capital sentences.' 3
47. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (companion case).
Even before legislative adoption of a mandatory statute, North Carolina had adopted a mandatory
scheme of sentencing by judicial decision. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973).
In the four years since Furman, North Carolina had sentenced 109 persons to death under its
mandatory requirement. See Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 7, at 4-5 (July 2, 1976). The North
Carolina mandatory death sentence statute included defendants convicted of rape, murder, burglary,
and arson. See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 446, 194 S.E.2d 19, 29 (1973).
48. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
49. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
50. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
51. In contemplating the distinction between "on its face" and "as applied," it is noteworthy that
Jurek's conviction was reversed, see Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), afPd on rehear-
ing, 623 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1709 (1981), Proffitt's sentence was held
invalid by a United States Magistrate, was reinstated by a United States District Judge, see Proflitt v.
Wainwright, No. 79-655, slip op. (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 1980), and is on appeal, and Gregg's conviction
and sentence as applied were being contested when he escaped from prison and was murdered during
the period of escape, see N.Y. Times, July 31, 1980, § A, at 12, col. 2.
52. See Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 7 (July 2, 1976).
53. Two prisoners were removed from death row in Arkansas in 1976, 66 in California in 1976,
nine in Delaware in 1976, three in Idaho in 1977, six in Indiana in 1977, three in Kentucky in 1977,
46 in Lousiana in 1976, three in Maryland in 1976, 22 in Mississippi in 1976-77, one in Montana in
1978, two in Nevada in 1977-78, nine in New Mexico in 1976-77, two in New York in 1977, 109 in
North Carolina in 1976, 36 in Okalahoma in 1976, approximately 16 in Pennsylvania in 1977, four
in Rhode Island in 1979, 23 in South Carolina in 1976-78, 41 in Tennessee in 1977, four in Virginia
in 1976, two in Washington in 1979, and five in Wyoming in 1977-78. See NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc., Changes in Death Row Populations from 1972 to August 1981 (1982)
(unpublished memorandum on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Changes in Death
Row Populations].
These data may differ from those in Death Row, US.A., see supra note 7, because of successive
and multiple impositions that may not appear in Death Row, US.A., death sentences vacated so soon
after their imposition that they are not reflected in Death Row, U.S.A., death sentences vacated so
soon before publication of Death Row, U.S.A. that it was not possible to remove them prior to publi-
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The attempts by many states in response to Furman to conform their
death penalty statutes to the mandates of the Constitution have not altered
the heavy flow of defendants onto and off of death row. A large propor-
tion of those who came onto death row between 1972 and 1980 have had
their convictions or sentences invalidated. Between 1972, just prior to
Furman, and December, 1980, at least 2216 persons entered or were on
death row. 4 The total increases to 2285 if one adds the pre-Furman New
Jersey and California death row populations,-" and reaches 2357 if one
includes defendants affected by Witherspoon and Jackson.6 The average
for this period is about 170 accessions per year; in 1980, there were over
200.1' But in December, 1980, there were in fact only 715 persons on
death row." If one subtracts from this the number of persons known to
have been invalidly sentenced that remained on death row, 9 only 596 of
cation, and errors discovered in Death Row, U.S.A. after publication.
54. By the time of Furman, 629 persons were on death row. Between then and 1980, 1650 addi-
tional sentences were imposed. Because 117 of the sentences imposed during the period were reimposi-
tions or multiple impositions for certain defendants, these additional sentences added 1533 persons to
death row, bringing the total number of persons on death row during these years to 2162. See
Changes in Death Row Populations, supra note 53.
55. See supra p. 915.
56. Between two dozen and over a hundred defendants had their sentences vacated as a result of
Witherspoon. See supra p. 915 & note 44. This Article assumes the approximate median of these two
figures, or 65, to be correct. When these 65 vacated sentences are combined with the seven affected by
Jackson, see supra p. 915, the 22 New Jersey sentences affected by Funicello, see supra p. 915, and
the 101 California sentences affected by Anderson, see supra p. 915, the total number of persons on
death row reaches 2402.
57. In 1972, after Furman, one sentence was imposed; in 1973, 48; in 1974, 190; in 1975, 290; in
1976, 273; in 1977, 180; in 1978, 236; in 1979, 189; and in 1980, 241. Although the total of these
figures is 1650 sentences, because of reimpositions and multiple sentences, of which there were 117,
1533 persons entered death row over the nine year period. See infra app.
58. Although Death Row, U.S.A., gives the death row population in December, 1980, as 718,
Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 7, at 1 (Dec. 20, 1980), the appendix, which is more precise, sets it as
715.
59. On any given date, the death row population contains some prisoners whose sentences or
convictions have been or certainly will be invalidated, but that have not yet actually been reduced to a
term of years. It is unrealistic to include them in the death row population. Therefore, in calculating
percentages, this article uses the December 1980 population figure, but adjusts it for those who left
subsequently or were slated soon to leave. This is the "adjusted December 1980" figure, which is
calculated by subtracting the numbers known to have been invalidly sentenced from the numbers of
those still on death row.
To arrive at the adjustment, the following decisions have been taken into account. In January,
1981, Oregon's Supreme Court declared its capital sentencing statute unconstitutional and four in-
mates were taken off the death row roster. See Oregon v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981)
(statute requiring judge to find mental state "different and greater" than that found by jury violates
defendant's right to jury trial under Oregon Constitution). In April, 1981, a decision of the Supreme
Court of Washington interpreted the state's capital punishment law in a way that made it violate
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), and as a result five inmates left death row. See State v.
Frampton, 627 P.2d 922 (Wash. 1981); Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 7, at 2 (Dec. 20, 1981). See
also State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 2d 1, 614 P.2d 164 (1980). The Supreme Court's decision in Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), probably invalidated the death sentences of perhaps 40 inmates on
Alabama's death row, although all of these sentences were not immediately vacated. Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980), held that the Texas capital sentencing statute, which required exclusion of jurors
whose deliberation would be "affected" by the fact that a case was capital, violated Witherspoon. As
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 908, 1982
the 715 persons on death row on that date will eventually remain.'0 Thus,
as of December 20, 1980, 1899, or 75%, of the 2402 persons who had
been on death row since Witherspoon had left death row or were certain
to leave it because their convictions had been, or soon would be,
invalidated."
Yet it might be argued that using a post-Furman starting point, after
which states and prosecutors had a better idea of how to proceed in death
cases, more accurately characterizes the system of capital punishment now
in use. As of December 20, 1980, 1533 defendants had been sentenced to
death under statutes adopted following Furman."2 But if only 596 re-
mained on death row," then 937-over 60%-had left or would soon
leave death row. Furthermore, neither the 79% nor the 60% reversal rate
for capital sentences takes into account prisoners on death row whose
cases are still being litigated actively. Some percentage, and possibly a
high percentage, of those prisoners will have their death sentences
overturned.
Either the 60% or 75% rate of reversal in capital cases is staggeringly
high compared to the reversal rate in ordinary criminal cases. For exam-
ple, federal criminal judgments that are appealed have a reversal rate of
6.5%,". and in California .8% of felony convictions are reversed.1
hearings demonstrate that Texas defendants were improperly tried before juries selected in violation
of Adams, perhaps 50 additional sentences will be vacated. As of October, 1981, 11 Texas death
sentences had been reversed on the basis of Adams, and other cases were pending. See Changes in
Death Row Populations, supra note 53, at 7-10 (Texas). Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981), is
estimated to require invalidation of thirty additional Texas sentences. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981,
§ A, at 1, col. 3. As of October, 1981, 10 Texas death sentences had been reversed on the basis of
Smith, and other cases were pending. See Changes in Death Row Populations, supra note 53, at 3, 9-
10 (Texas).
60. This calculation is based upon a December 1980 death row population of 715, from which a
total of 119 who were virtually certain to leave death row has been subtracted (four in Oregon, five in
Washington, 40 in Alabama, and 80 in Texas (30 due to Smith, and 50 due to Adams)). See supra
note 59.
61. To summarize, 65 invalidations occurred as a result of Witherspoon, seven as a result of
Jackson, 22 as a result of Funicello, 101 as a result of Anderson, 674 as a result of Furman; 901
invalidations and removals for other reasons occurred from 1972 to 1980, see infra app., and 129
invalidations were likely to occur as of December 1980, see supra pp. 917-918 & notes 59 & 60.
62. See supra note 57.
63. See supra pp. 917-918.
64. The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
reports that the total number of defendants convicted of crime in federal courts during the 12 month
period ending June 30, 1980, was 28,598. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT 97. Slightly over 15%, or 4405, of those defendants appealed. See id. at 2 (Table 2). Approxi-
mately 6.5%, or 290, of those who appealed during this period won their appeals during the same
twelve month period. See id. at 51 (Table 10).
65. In California, in the 1979-80 fiscal year, there were approximately 41,000 prison commit-
ments for felony convictions. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1981 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVER-
NOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 6. More than 38,000 of these defendants pleaded guilty. See id. at 4.
There were 4,586 criminal appeals during this period, some of which were from the sentence after a
plea of guilty. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., 1981 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS 74. The 324 reversals during the same period constituted well
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III. The Prospects For A Viable System of Capital Punishment
Virtually all capital sentences and convictions that have been litigated to
a conclusion have been reversed. Yet the number of inmates on death row
creeps up as the number of accessions continues to exceed the number of
reversals and executions: 167 entered in 1977, 219 in 1978, 156 in 1979,
and 203 in 1980.6 Will death row continue to grow without end? If not,
will judicial reversals continue to limit the death row population, or will
execution commence in earnest, controlling and ultimately reducing the
death row population? Alternatively, will capital punishment be
abolished?
Three factors help to answer these questions. First, such reversible er-
rors are more likely to decrease if in the past they have been few and
simple, rather than varied and numerous. If sufficiently diverse, we may
fairly conclude that there is something fatally flawed about the capital
convicting and sentencing process. Even if it is possible to patch up one or
two defects, or even half a dozen or more, the remaining system will con-
tinue to generate frequent reversible error. Second, the number of rever-
sals in capital cases will decrease if capital defendants choose not to ex-
haust their legal remedies prior to execution, if review procedures are
truncated, or if the grounds for error are reduced. Finally, a viable capital
punishment system requires that public opinion accept a dramatic increase
in the number of executions.
A. Reversals in Capital Cases: The Various Grounds
In fact, the courts have found so many different grounds for reversal in
capital cases that numerous errors are likely to be made in the future. One
category of reversals is that of persons sentenced to death who are subse-
quently found innocent, who are acquitted following a new trial, or who
are found guilty of a noncapital offense rather than a capital one. In one
case, for example, the state had withheld evidence relevant to the case, 7
under 10% of all appeals but only approximately .8% of the 41,000 convictions. See id. at 81 (Table
X-A) (285 reversed for retrial, 32 with no retrial possible, and 7% dismissed).
Nor is California atypical. Maryland had over 41,000 criminal dispositions in fiscal 1979-80. See
1979-1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MARYLAND JUDICIARY, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 59 (Table C-
16). The Court of Appeals disposed of 61, reversing 32. Id. at 15 (Table CA-7). The Court of Special
Appeals disposed of 695, reversing 99. Id. at 23 (Table CSA-5). The combined percentage of reversals
by appellate courts was therefore about 18%, while the ratio of reversals to all dispositions was about
.3%. Maryland also permits review of criminal sentences. Of 250 sentences reviewed, 226 were left
unchanged. Id. at 80 (Table CC-37).
66. See infra app. at 7.
67. See St. Petersberg Times, February 24, 1978, § B, at 18, col. 1; see also State v. Pitts, No.
32981, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 28, 1963), afl'd, 166 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1964). In that case, the
defendant's convictions were set aside on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. See State v. Pitts,
227 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (discussing unpublished trial court order). A new trial was
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while in another four cases the defendants were released after another
person's confession to the crime was corroborated.68 There have been at
least six other recent cases of defendants sentenced to death who later
were determined to be not guilty.69 In addition, there have been an inde-
terminate number of defendants who, after having been sentenced to death
and having had their convictions reversed, were tried again and convicted
of a non-capital offense, or who, having had their sentences vacated, were
resentenced to less than a life sentence.7
A much larger number of cases have held that the capitally sentenced
defendant was convicted in violation of the Federal Constitution. The
grounds of reversal include unreasonable search and seizure," violation of
the Miranda rule,72 denial of change of venue,7' prosecutor's reference to
commenced, and the defendants were convicted a second time. See Pitts v. State, 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming trial court's denial of motion for new hearing). In September 1975,
Curtis Adams confessed to the murders for which the defendants had been sentenced, and the defen-
dants were pardoned. See G. MILLER, INVITATION TO A LYNCHING (1975); Tallahassee Democrat,
Dec. 1, 1976, at 12, col. 2.
68. See Detroit News, December 16, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1; Albequerque Journal, October 21,
1975, § A, at 1. See also Albequerque Journal, December 6, 1975, § A, at 4; Albequerque Journal,
December 4, 1975, § A, at 6.
69. In Arizona in 1977, Jonathan Treadaway, a capital defendant who had been sentenced to
death and whose conviction had been reversed, see State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061
(1977), was acquitted at a new trial, see State v. Treadaway, No. CR83446, slip op. (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
1977). In 1978, Earl Charles was ordered freed by a superior court judge in Savannah, Georgia, who
three and one-half years earlier had sentenced hin to death, because Charles' innocence was demon-
strated by a police detective who came forward to admit that he had seen him at work on the date and
at the time that the crime was committed. See State v. Charles, No. 23,392 (Ga. S. Ct. July 5, 1978)
(statement of prosecutor's intent to place case on dead docket). See also Atlanta Constitution, July 6,
1978, § A, at 1, col. 3; Savannah Morning News, June 15, 1978, § D, at 1. Also in 1978, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted Calvin Sellars bond pending state appeals, affirming a district
court judge who held that he had been convicted and sentenced to death based upon perjured testi-
mony. See Sellars v. Estelle, 571 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). See also Sellars v. Estelle,
450 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D. Tex. 1978). In 1979, prosecutors decided not to retry Sellars because a key
witness could not be found. In 1979, Gary Beeman, who had been sentenced to death, having success-
fully appealed his conviction, was retried a second time and was acquitted. See Ohio v. Beeman, No.
9833, slip op. (Ashtabula County Ct. C.P.) (sentenced June 28, 1976, acquitted from second trial
October 4, 1979); Ohio v. Beeman, No. 894, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App., 11th App. Dist. April 20, 1978)
(reversing first conviction). In the same year, Erwin Simants, following a successful state post-convic-
tion petition, see Simants v. State, 202 Neb. 828, 277 N.W.2d 217 (1979), was acquitted at a new
trial by reason of insanity, see Simants v. State, No. B2904, slip op. (Lincoln County, Nebraska D.
Ct. October 1980). Finally, in 1980, a district attorney in Flint Judicial Circuit of Georgia released
Jerry Banks, who had been sentenced to death and who had spent 6 years in prison litigating his case
in appellate and post-appellate proceedings, because the prosecution was found to have withheld criti-
cal evidence. See Atlanta Constitution, January 6, 1981, § A, at 1, col. I. See also Banks v. State, 235
Ga. 121, 218 S.E.2d 851 (1975) (reversing original conviction on grounds that prosecutor knowingly
withheld evidence favorable to defendant); Wicker, The Final Verdict, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1980, §
A, at 31, col. 5. Banks had been sentenced to death again after a second trial. See Banks v. Glass, 242
Ga. 518, 250 S.E.2d 431 (1978) (denying habeas petition); Banks v. State, 237 Ga. 325, 227 S.E.2d
380 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
70. North Carolina reported five such cases between 1977 and 1981. See D.W. Stephens, Appen-
dix of All Cases Tried Pursuant to North Carolina G.S. I SA-2000 (listing cases in which defendant
was convicted of first degree murder from 1977 to 1981) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
71. E.g., Kleason v. State, 560 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
72. E.g., Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Vanderbilt v. State, 563
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defendant's refusal to testify,74 coerced confession," denial of the right to
compulsory process,76 denial of the right to an impartial jury," denial of
the right of confrontation,7" and incompetence of counsel."
In addition to capital convictions, capital sentences have continued to be
reversed. The Supreme Court has upset capital sentences based upon
Witherspoon,s" the vagueness of the sentencing statute,8 ex parte consul-
tation of probation reports to the judge, 2 double jeopardy,83 and admission
of impermissible psychiatric testimony. 4 State courts have reversed
sentences because of ex post facto application of a statute," suppression by
the prosecutor of exculpatory evidence," and violation of the prohibition
against double jeopardy. 7
Capital convictions and sentences have also been reversed on a large
number of state law grounds. Oregon and Massachusetts have both invali-
dated the death penalty under their state constitutions. 8 Other state law
grounds include conviction of a crime different from that charged in the
indictment, 9 failure to charge concerning the credibility of witnesses," ad-
mission of hearsay evidence,9 refusal to sever the trial of two defendants
when counsel has a conflict of interest,92 failure to sequester the jury,93
S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978); c. State v. Berry, 592 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1980) (interrogation
violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
73. E.g., Ruiz v. State, 265 Ark. 875, 582 S.W.2d 915 (Ark. 1979); Swindler v. State, 264 Ark.
107, 569 S.W.2d 120 (1978); O'Brient v. State, 588 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Durrough
v. State, 562 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Grim. App. 1978).
74. E.g., Franklin v. State, 606 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d
891 (Tex. Grim. App. 1975).
75. E.g., Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1709 (1981);
State v. Berry, 592 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1980).
76. E.g., Whitmore v. State, 570 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976).
77. E.g., State v. Monroe, 366 So. 2d 1345 (La. 1978); Simants v. State, 202 Neb. 828, 277
N.W.2d 217 (1979); Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87 (1980).
78. E.g., Porter v. State, 578 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Grim. App. 1979).
79. E.g., Voyles v. Watkins, 489 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Miss. 1980); People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d
142, 599 P.2d 587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979); State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d 12 (La. 1980).
80. E.g., Adams v. State, 448 U.S. 38 (1980); see also Bums v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1979); People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal. 3d 814, 608 P.2d 689 , 163 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1980); Hovila v.
State, 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
81. E.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
82. E.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
83. E.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
84. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
85. E.g., State v. Detter, 298 N.C. 604, 260 S.E.2d 567 (1979); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758
(Tenn. 1979).
86. E.g., Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874 (Utah 1979).
87. E.g., Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Grim. App. 1980).
88. See District Attorney for Suffolk Dist. v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980); supra note
59 (Oregon death penalty struck down).
89. See Watters v. State, 369 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1979); Clements v. State, 370 So. 2d 723 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979).
90. See Ashlock v. State, 367 So. 2d 560 (Ala. Grim. App. 1978).
91. See State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
92. See Irving v. Hargett, No. WC 79-75-0S-0, slip op. (N.D. Miss. July 24, 1981).
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misunderstanding about plea bargaining agreements,94 and prosecutorial
vindictiveness for refusal to plea bargain."'
B. Alternative Methods for Reducing Error in Capital Cases
Even if the various grounds for error in capital cases are so numerous
that they are likely to be repeated, certain changes in the capital punish-
ment system might nonetheless result in a system less prone to error in the
future. Such changes might include: (1) capital defendants no longer seek-
ing to exhaust every possible legal remedy before execution; (2) truncating
the stages of review and the time taken to exhaust them; and (3) reducing
the number of grounds for invalidating sentences and convictions.
The first possibility is highly unlikely. Only a minuscule number of
capitally sentenced defendants have sought suicide by execution.96 The rest
will litigate until there is no possibility of proceeding further. Their ca-
pacity to contest the death penalty is enhanced by the availability of vol-
unteer and court-appointed counsel, public defenders, and public-interest
law firms. Furthermore, recent decisions indicate that third parties now
will be able to contest the death sentences of at least some who purport to
waive their rights. 7
Efforts to limit substantially federal post-conviction review face serious
obstacles. Indeed, the number of capitally sentenced defendants who have
been found innocent argues powerfully against adopting limitations that
would have allowed them to be executed. The much larger number who
have been found illegally or unfairly convicted or sentenced argues with
similar force. Consequently, suggestions that capital litigation be expe-
dited have been criticized severely. 8 Nevertheless, it is possible that some
limits will be imposed on federal post-conviction review. There have been
proposals to limit federal habeas corpus,99 although none have been en-
acted. Recent cases have circumscribed somewhat the availability of re-
93. See State v. Parker, 372 La. 1037 (1979).
94. See Thompson v. State, 351 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1977).
95. See People v. Walker, 419 N.E.2d 1167 (Il1. 1981).
96. See supra p. 909.
97. See supra note 31.
98. See Adler, Florida's Zealous Prosecutors: Death Specialists 5 AM. LAW. 35, 36 (1981) (refer-
ing to lobbying efforts that would expedite processing of habeas corpus petitions in capital cases). For
commentary on expediting capital cases, see Coleman v. Balkcom, 101 S. Ct. 2031 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in denial of cert.) Justice Stevens discusses a proposal by Justice Rehnquist to preclude
district courts from reviewing writs of habeas corpus in capital cases on any grounds previously re-
jected by the Supreme Court. Stevens notes that, "We must, however, also be as sure as possible that
novel procedural shortcuts have not permitted error of a constitutional magnitude to occur. For after
all, death cases are indeed different in kind from all other litigation. The penalty, once imposed, is
irrevocable." Id. at 2033.
99. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME,
FINAL REPORT 58-60 (1981).
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view in habeas corpus proceedings,' 0 but do not appear to have greatly
affected the ability of defendants to contest the kinds of error that occur in
capital cases. In any event, such cases have no significance for state courts,
which have generated the largest part of the reversals. 101
There also is no reason to believe that there will be a drastic reduction
in the number of errors found in capital convictions or sentences. First,
states have blatantly violated clear legal standards in the past. For exam-
ple, after Witherspoon, any law student who had studied criminal or con-
stitutional law knew that the Texas statute, which excluded from jury
service potential jurors who might be "affected" because the case is capi-
tal, was unconstitutional.0 2 Yet, Texas kept the law on the books and
applied it for twelve years. 03 What explains the failure of Texas and
other states to comply with clear constitutional standards? Perhaps it is
inertia, lack of comprehension, or resistance to change. Certainly, the ex-
traordinary range of errors found in capital cases suggests that absent
some drastic and unforeseeable change in circumstances, many errors will
continue to occur.
Second, although these errors occur in non-capital cases as well, for
good reasons a higher level of certainty is required in capital cases. As the
Supreme Court reiterated in Beck v. Alabama,"4 the risk of assigning the
death penalty when a lesser penalty might be the appropriate result "can-
not be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. As we
have often stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between
the death penalty and lesser punishments . ...
Third, the methods we have had, the methods we now have, and any
conceivable method of awarding the death penalty involve contradictions
and unreliability that will generate mistakes. For example, Furman cor-
rectly pointed out that like cases had been treated differently, indicating
freakish and arbitrary application of the death penalty. In response,
guided discretion laws were enacted. Then, in 1978, Lockett v. Ohio'0 6
rightfully condemned the Ohio guided discretion law for employing a
fixed list of mitigating circumstances and not requiring juries to consider
any and all mitigating circumstances. In that case Sandra Lockett, sen-
tenced to death, was only 18 and had never fired a shot. She had been
outside a pawn shop when, unknown to and unplanned by her, a compan-
100. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
101. See supra pp. 921-922.
102. The Texas statute was struck down in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
103. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 47 n.5 (1981) (citing twelve cases in which Texas courts
had violated Witherspoon).
104. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
105. Id. at 637.
106. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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ion who had entered the shop to commit a robbery killed the pawnbroker.
The Supreme Court held that the sentencer should have had the opportu-
nity to take into account her background and character and the circum-
stances of the crime, even though the statutory list of mitigating circum-
stances precluded his doing so. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that
leaving the list of mitigating factors wide open was a return to the pre-
Furman period, when "similar cases" were treated differently. In a sense
he is correct. On the one hand, similar cases should be treated similarly;
but on the other, each case is different, if only because every individual is
unique. Both the majority and the dissent were right, each according to its
own terms. If capital punishment is retained, there is no solution to this
dilemma.
C. The Role of Public Opinion
It appears that in recent years public opinion has increasingly favored
capital punishment. This increase suggests that prosecutorial and legisla-
tive efforts to impose the death penalty may become more successful. This
increase may, however, be more apparent than real.107 Even if it is real,
the spectacle of increased executions might moderate public support for
futher implementation of capital punishment. During the period in which
the United States in fact carried out executions, public support for capital
punishment decreased."0 '
In order to make the capital punishment system viable, the execution
rate would have to rise significantly above that countenanced in modern
times. Before there could be any reduction of the death row population,
which is now over 1000,09 it would be necessary to kill 200 defendants
each year just to offset the new arrivals on death row. In the decade of the
1960's, prior to the moratorium on executions, there was an average of
19.1 executions per year. 10 The sixties were atypical, however, because of
the developing moratorium and the large number of stays leading up to it.
Potentially more representative are the 1950's, when the average number
of executions per year was 72, or the 1940's, when it was 128. The 1930's
had the highest annual rate, with an average of 152 executions per year.
107. See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1245
(1974) (overviewing public attitudes toward capital punishment). Vidmar & Ellsworth assert that
while opinion polls of the general population have shown an increase in support for capital punish-
ment, studies conducted in the past twenty years that control for demographic variables or crime type
show little change in levels of support. Id.
108. See id. at 1249 (public support for death penalty fell consistently from 1936 to 1966).
109. See supra note 7.
110. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 16 (1978) (Table 1) (1973 National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin No. SD-NPS-CP-2).
From 1960 to 1964 there were 181 executions, while the number decreased to 10 during the years
1965 through 1969. Id. at 17 (Table 1).
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The peak year was 1935, with 199 executions."' Although that rate might
keep even with accessions to death row today, it would not bring about a
net reduction in the death row population. One might, of course, challenge
the relevance of these historical statistics on the ground that the country is
now much larger. But the growth of the total population is offset by other
factors: there are more abolitionist states today, and some crimes-such as
rape-are no longer capital. Are we likely to kill 199 plus per year? It is
not unreasonable to assume that the country today, if it undertook legal
killing, would countenance killing no more than we did in the sixties or
perhaps the fifties.
Most countries of western civilization do not execute at all. Great Brit-
ain, the countries of Western Europe, and Canada have all abolished cap-
ital punishment.'12 Were the United States to resume executions at the
current rate of death sentences imposed every year, some 200, we would
put ourselves in the company of South Africa, which according to Am-
nesty International executed 67 persons in 1976,"1 the Soviet Union,
which publishes no statistics but according to Andrei Sakharov executes
"several hundreds" per year,' " and Iran, which Amnesty International
reports executed more than 300 between 1972 and 1976,11 a rate that has
increased since the Islamic Revolution."" This international comparison
suggests that the most we would do, should killings begin in earnest, still
would not deplete the death row population.
Therefore, in view of the vigor and frequency of appeals that defen-
dants will press, the likelihood that review will continue to remain availa-
ble to correct unacceptable injustices that otherwise would result in execu-
tions, the careful scrutiny that will continue to focus on capital cases, the
inherent contradictions of the capital sentencing process, and the moral
constraints limiting the number of executions this country will accept,
capital punishment will continue to be relatively infrequent in years to
come. It certainly will not be so frequent that death row executions will
equal new arrivals.
111. Id.
112. On capital punishment in member countries of the United Nations, see Capital Punishment
Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. E/1980/9, Annex, at 1-6. Since the report was pub-
lished, France and Ireland have joined the abolitionist nations. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1981, § A, at
5, col. I (Ireland); N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1981, § A, at 4, col. 3 (France). Between 1974 and 1978,
France had three actual executions, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY 111-15
(1979), while in 1980 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for abolition of
capital punishment within member countries, see N.Y. Times, April 23, 1980, § A, at 18, col. 1.
113. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 112, at 58-61.
114. A. SAKHAROV, ALARM AND HOPE 122 (1978) ("[Tjhere are grounds to believe that several
hundred persons are executed annually [in the Soviet Union] ... )
115. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 112, at 171-72.
116. See Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 1981, at 18, col. 1 (1800 executed between June and October,
1981).
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IV. The Inevitable Failure of the Capital Punishment System
It is likely, then, that we shall continue to have a capital punishment
system substantially unchanged from that of the last fifteen years. While
sentencing hundreds to death per year, that system accomplishes death
row population control mainly by judicial review and only rarely by kill-
ing. It is a roller coaster system of capital justice, in which large numbers
of people are constantly spilling into and out of death row, but virtually
no actual executions take place. Yet, if we are to have any legal executions
in this country, it must be under this type of system. Such a system has
not only proved necessary to assure that innocent people are not executed,
that constitutional rights are not violated, and that invidious considera-
tions such as race are not the true motivating forces behind executions; it
also accurately reflects, it seems, our civilized society's fundamental un-
willingness actually to kill the hundreds of people that the decisions of
judges and juries place on death row each year.
Administering capital punishment in this way has not, however,
avoided the arbitrariness of the pre-Furman system of capital punishment.
While Furman and Gregg have required that like cases be treated as simi-
larly as possible, taking into account the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors in each case, another element must be worked into the equation: the
competence of prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts-all those who col-
lectively administer the criminal justice system. A defendant who is
viewed as less offensive than many who have been spared death may be
put to death because of how the justice system worked, not because of his
or her individual qualities or the nature of the crime. Errors by these
administrators of the justice system that bring about reversals of convic-
tions occur without regard to the egregiousness of the defendant or the
crime he or she has committed. An error of the type in Witherspoon,
Lockett, Estelle v. Smith, or Jurek may insulate from the death penalty
the most horrible individual and the most egregious crime. The case of the
only person involuntarily put to death since 1967, John Spenkelink, illus-
trates that the variables in the lottery are beyond the control of anyone
who desires to make it work fairly. He was a drifter who killed a fellow
drifter traveling companion. The man he killed had beaten and sodomized
him and stolen his money. Spenkelink said that he had struck back in
retaliation. Ray Marky, the Florida Assistant Attorney General who rep-
resented the State in Spenkelink, has said, "In fact, I really felt that he
was probably the least obnoxious individual on death row in terms of the
crime he committed. . . I didn't have some hideous monster . . . who
strangled three generations of women. We had a guy who killed a
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faggot."M7
Moreover, it may be that the use of judicial review to control death row
populations invites the very errors that such review is designed to correct.
Consider the Private Slovik phenomenon."' During World War II, the
only American serviceman the armed forces executed for a capital
crime-in his case, desertion-was Private Slovik. Those who participated
in the death penalty process at lower levels did not expect him to die, but
wanted to make him an example for others. They assumed that someone
else further up the line would recall the death sentence. No one did.
There is some evidence that those involved in the capital sentencing pro-
cess, observing the numerous reversals, may suppress doubts about impos-
ing the death penalty because they think someone else will rescind the
order to execute." 9
No theoretical penological justification for the death penalty supports
the capital punishment system as it is now administered. Whatever view
one takes of the deterrent capacity of the death penalty when it is the
swift and certain result of criminal activity, the current, roller coaster sys-
tem-though absolutely necessary to protect the innocent from execution,
to safeguard basic constitutional rights, and to avoid racially motivated
executions-makes swift and certain executions impossible. A hypothetical
killer who calculates his chances of being executed before committing
homicide must calculate that he or she is quite unlikely to be put to death.
Likewise, whatever retributive function capital punishment might serve,
assuming that executions dissipate the anger of victims' families and
friends or the public, cannot be served by the current system of capital
justice, in which executions occur only rarely and after great delay. Alter-
natively, if the purpose of capital punishment is incapacitation, since a
death sentence has come to mean life imprisonment in virtually all cases,
the death penalty surely has not incapacitated offenders any more effec-
tively than would actual sentences of life imprisonment. In short, in all of
its inconstancy, vacillation, and ungainliness, the system not only looks
irrational but serves no purpose.
117. S. Adler, Florida's Zealous Prosecutors, Death Specialists, AM. LAW., Sept. 1981, at 35-36.
The egregious language in the quotation further illustrates the role that irrelevant factors play in the
imposition of the death penalty.
118. See W.B. HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 169 (1970).
119. See State v. Gilbert, 258 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 1979) (in closing argument solicitor stated jury's
sentence would be reviewed); Prevatte v. State, 214 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. 1975) (prosecutor encouraged
jury to take less than full responsibility by informing it that trial judge and appellate court could set
aside death sentences); Letter of J.W. Toomer, Ph.D., to Florida Public Defender, Sept. 22, 1975, at
1-2 (setting forth content of interview with jurors who had sentenced defendant to death: "[D]uring
the penalty phase the first vote resulted in a tie, 6-6. The swing vote was convinced to vote to recom-
mend 'death' with the arguments that (1) it was late, people were tired and ready to go and (2) '...
have you ever known of anyone who got death to actually die recently in the state .... '") (on file
with Yale Law Journal).
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Nevertheless, despite the fact that the administration of capital punish-
ment in the United States is a lurching roller coaster whose trip is punc-
tuated by occasional, irrational executions, capital punishment will con-
tinue for a time. The commitment to keep it and the reluctance to use it
are too great for change to occur. Sooner or later, however, we will have
to come to the conclusion that there is no way to make a capital punish-
ment system work. If we want to retain our American system of fairness,
legality, and equality, capital punishment can proceed only in its current
form. The price of actually using capital punishment at a rate that would
make it workable would be overturning volumes of constitutional and le-
gal rights that protect us in a wide range of other concerns unrelated to
capital punishment.
The United States is not willing to undertake widespread repeal of ba-
sic constitutional and legal protections in order to execute substantial
numbers of death-sentenced prisoners on a regular basis. But to continue
the death penalty with those necessary constraints inevitably violates the
basic precept of Furman, that capital punishment may be inflicted only
evenhandedly, not arbitrarily or "freakishly." Although a five-to-four de-
cision, Furman is now firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence,
having been affirmed in Gregg v. Georgia,12 Lockett v. Ohio,' and God-
frey v Georgia.2 2 The response of the states to Furman was a valiant
effort to introduce evenhandedness where irregularity had prevailed. But
the outcome has been no more successful than that of the prior system of
capital punishment. This failure has not resulted from lack of effort but
rather from the impossibility of fashioning an acceptable method of ad-
ministering capital punishment while maintaining the system of rights
that our Constitution mandates.
120. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
121. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
122. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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Appendix
Additions to and removals from Death Row














OK (avg) 12 0













NC (avg) 36 0
OH 5 0
OK (avg) 12 0
PA 2 0
SC (avg) 8 0




As indicated for each year, impositions for some states are not known precisely. For these states an
overall total of impositions over several years is known, which is set forth above as "(avg)" per year
for certain years, as indicated.
I "REMOVE" includes all reasons for removal from the death row population: court decisions, com-
mutations, suicides, deaths, executions.
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23 * includes 3 reimpositions
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 1 reimposition
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327 * includes 7 reimpositions
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 1 reimposition





























































































* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 2 reimpositions
* includes 4 reimpositions
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 13 reimpositions






























































* includes 3 reimpositions
* includes 4 reimpositions
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 3 reimpositions
* includes 1 reimposition
* includes 3 reimpositions
* includes 3 reimpositions
169 * includes 23 reimpositions
(avg)
































































































* includes 8 reimpositions
* includes 4 reimpositions
* includes 6 reimpositions
* includes 33 reimpositions
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ALA 11* 18 * includes 6 reimpositions
AZ 11* 8 * includes 5 reimpositions
ARK 3 0
CAL 24* 7 * includes I reimposition
DEL 2 1
FLA 34* 15 * includes 4 reimpositions











NC 9* 1 * includes one defendant
sentenced twice for two
separate crimes
OK 9* 2 * one defendant received
death penalty in 1979 for
separate crime
ORE 3 0
PA 9* 2 * includes 3 reimpositions
SC 8* 1 * includes 3 reimpositions
and one defendant receiving
separate sentence for second
crime
TN 7 1
TX 29* 19 * includes 3 reimpositions
UT 1 4
VA 8* 3 * includes 1 reimposition
241* 120 * 38 reimpositions






1975 288* 23 * includes 3 reimpositions
1976 273* 327 * includes 7 reimpositions
1977 180* 137 * includes 13 reimpositions
1978 242* 169 * includes 23 reimpositions
1979 189* 117 * includes 33 reimpositions
1980 241* 120 * includes 38 reimpositions
1652* 901 * includes 117 reimpositions
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